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Abstract—This paper presents a machine learning 
approach to detect and classify misbehaviour in Vehicular Ad-
hoc Networks. We describe three novel features obtained from 
analysis of 𝒏 consecutive locations of a vehicle to form a 
judgement about its behaviour. These features are used in two 
machine learning algorithms (K-Nearest Neighbour and 
Support Vector Machine) for detecting attacks in the VeReMi 
dataset.  We show that the overall precision rates can be as 
high as 99.7%, whilst the recall rates are consistently higher 
than 99%. The features we propose also help to reduce the 
overall confusion rate to less than 4.7% when classifying 
different types of attacks. We also show that our models can be 
used for effective classification after as few as 3 observations, 
suggesting the potential for application of the method in near 
real-time situations thereby improving safety and security.    
Keywords—location spoofing, trajectory inspection, VeReMi, 
machine learning, misbehaviour detection 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A. VANET Security 
Vehicular Ad-hoc Networks (VANET) are systems that 
are being employed to enhance road safety and transport 
efficiency through the exchange of information between 
vehicles (V2V) and infrastructure (V2I). For example, a 
vehicle can send information (e.g. current location, speed, or 
acceleration) through Basic Safety Messages (BSMs) 
exchanged with other vehicles thereby improving the overall 
sensor’s line-of-sight and situational awareness [1]. 
However, such vehicular networks are susceptible to a 
number of security and privacy concerns [2]. One of the 
most critical issues is that attackers can inject falsified 
information into the communication stream to manipulate 
others’ driving decisions, leading to consequences such as 
false warnings, fake traffic reports, sudden braking or even 
accidents. Verifying the correctness of the information 
exchanged remains an open challenge [1].  
B. Misbehaviour Detection and Classification 
Misbehaviour attacks need to be detected to eliminate 
harmful sources of information. Moreover, attackers can 
employ numerous strategies to spoof data with the aim of 
achieving different objectives. Therefore, in addition to 
detecting attacks, classifying the attackers is also a concern if 
we are to understand their behaviours and improve future 
decision making.  
The data-centric approach is one of the main techniques 
employed to tackle spoofing attacks, and involves collecting 
and analysing performance data using plausibility and 
consistency metrics. Some researchers have tried to predict 
future locations through models such as vehicle dynamics for 
verification, whereas others have focussed on finding 
malicious patterns in the data. While a number of features 
have been proposed for detection and classification purposes 
[1, 3, 4], their performance is still poor in many situations.  
C. Contributions and Paper Structure 
In this paper, we investigate the feasibility of using 
historical trajectory to detect and classify misbehaviour 
attacks. We develop machine learning models (K-Nearest 
Neighbour and Support Vector Machine, KNN and SVM, 
respectively) based on three features which can be extracted 
from 𝑛 consecutive location observations in the trajectory 
data: Movement Plausibility Check, Minimum Trajectory 
Distance, and Minimum Translation Trajectory Distance. We 
evaluate the performance of our models in detecting and 
classifying attacks in the VeReMi dataset [5], a labelled 
dataset built in VEINS [6], which offers five different types 
of location spoofing attacks (see Table I). We compare our 
solution to a similar machine learning approach presented in 
[1]. We also vary the length of the sequences inspected to 
study its impacts on performance.  
Our contributions are three-fold:  
 We introduce three novel features to use in machine 
learning models, which can significantly improve 
performance in misbehaviour detection and 
classification.  
 Our approach reduces the dependency on velocity 
data to make judgements, therefore avoiding the 
chance that attackers can craft useful velocity data to 
circumvent detection. 
 We study the impact of the length of observations on 
detection capability. This study shows that our 
models can detect and classify misbehaviour attacks 
effectively after as few as three consecutive 
observations, which makes them applicable for near 
real-time detection.  
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section II 
reviews the related work in VANET misbehaviour detection. 
Section III details our proposed approach. Section IV 
describes the experimental setup while Section V evaluates 
the performance. Finally, Section VI concludes the paper and 
presents suggestions for future work.  
II. RELATED WORK 
When V2V data are used to support driving decisions, 
detecting falsified information being broadcasting becomes 
more important. Most existing detection approaches require 
the presence of a central authority to make judgements based 
on monitoring and analysing messages broadcast from all 
vehicles in the VANET [1].  
A comprehensive survey on misbehaviour detection can 
be found in [4], in which the authors categorised the 
detection techniques into two main themes: node-centric and 
data-centric. The former technique focusses on verifying the 
interactions between nodes through information such as 
packet frequencies or message formats. Alternatively, the 
latter approach investigates the content of exchanged 
messages to determine validity. 
This paper uses a data-centric approach. We focus on 
specifying the key plausibility features of the location 
information to detect and classify the senders of malicious 
data. A number of techniques have been developed to check 
the plausibility of location data. Based on previous 
information, some researchers have tried to estimate 
plausible locations and compare them with the reported 
locations.  Margins are used for detection purposes. For 
example, authors in [3] have developed simple plausibility 
checks for fast and efficient processing. However, existing 
approaches have shown limited performance, while also 
requiring a majority of the network to be legitimate. Other 
researchers have tried to improve the accuracy of detection 
by applying more sophisticated models for estimation. For 
instance, researchers in [7] used a Kalman Filter while 
authors in [8] used the vehicle dynamics model. However, 
these models require all the previous data to be accurate for 
an accurate estimation, which is not the case when attackers 
inject false data consistently into the communications. 
Recently, plausibility checks have been used as features 
integrated into machine learning models (such as KNN and 
SVM) to detect forged locations [1]. However, these models 
require full journey information of the suspected vehicle 
before making a final decision. Moreover, some of the 
features rely on the velocity information broadcast from 
suspect vehicles, which may be crafted to disrupt detection 
mechanisms.  
When legitimate vehicles operate in transportation, their 
logged trajectories are reliable reference sources to predict 
moving behaviour. For example, in [9], trajectory data was 
used to predict upcoming journeys for safety purposes. 
However, to the best of our knowledge, there has been little 
work which uses trajectory data to detect and classify 
location spoofing attacks. In this work, we use trajectory data 
as relaxed ground truths to differentiate the falsification 
misbehaviour of attackers rather than to accurately predict 
next locations. 
III. PROPOSED APPROACH 
In this section, we will first present definitions of basic 
concepts to learn from the trajectory data. We then introduce 
the features we have designed to detect and classify the 
attacks. 
A. General Definition  
Definition 1 State. The state 𝑠 of a vehicle is a set of 
information to exchange with others. In this paper, 𝑠 contains 
location, velocity, and time information 𝑠 = {𝑥, 𝑦, 𝑣𝑥, 𝑣𝑦, 𝑡}, 
where (𝑥, 𝑦) is the latitude and longitude position, (𝑣𝑥, 𝑣𝑦) 
indicates the latitude and longitude velocity, and 𝑡 is the time 
that this information was logged. 
Definition 2 Trajectory. The trajectory m is a set of 
consecutive sequences of vehicle state data: 
 𝑚 = {𝑠1, 𝑠2, … , 𝑠𝑘} =  {(𝑥1, 𝑦1, 𝑣𝑥1, 𝑣𝑦1 , 𝑡1), … ,
(𝑥𝑘 , 𝑦𝑘 , 𝑣𝑥𝑘 , 𝑣𝑦𝑘 , 𝑡𝑘)}, where the states are reported 
continuously and sorted by ascending time, which means 
∀𝑖 ∈ {1, … , 𝑘 − 1}: 0 < 𝑡𝑖+1 − 𝑡𝑖 ≤ 𝜀𝑡, where 𝜀𝑡 is the 
maximum time allowed between consecutive sampling.   
Definition 3 Legitimate trajectory history. We define the 
legitimate trajectory history as the set of unique trajectories 
recorded by all legitimate vehicles in transportation and 
denoted as 𝐿 = {𝐿1, … , 𝐿𝑙}. 
Definition 4 n-sequence inspection trajectory. Given a 
suspected trajectory 𝑚 with 𝑘 states, 𝑘 > 𝑛, an n-sequence 
inspection trajectory 𝑚𝑖  is a subset of 𝑛 consecutive states 
extracted from the k states: 
𝑚𝑖 = {(𝑥𝑖 ,  𝑦𝑖 , 𝑣𝑥𝑖 , 𝑣𝑦𝑖 , 𝑡𝑖),
(𝑥𝑖+1, 𝑦𝑖+1, 𝑣𝑥𝑖+1, 𝑣𝑦𝑖+1, 𝑡𝑖+1),   … ,
(𝑥𝑖+𝑛,  𝑦𝑖+𝑛, 𝑣𝑥𝑖+𝑛 , 𝑣𝑦𝑖+𝑛 , 𝑡𝑖+𝑛)} | 𝑖 + 𝑛 ≤ 𝑘 
Definition 5 Distance between two trajectories. Given 
two equal k-length trajectories 𝑚𝑢 and 𝑚𝑣, the distance 
𝑑(𝑚𝑢, 𝑚𝑣) between them is a measure of how close the two 
trajectories are. We only consider the positions of the 
trajectories rather than other factors such as velocity and 
time. The distance will be calculated as:  
𝑑(𝑚𝑢, 𝑚𝑣) =
1
𝑘
∑ √(𝑥𝑖
𝑚𝑢 − 𝑥𝑖
𝑚𝑣)2 + (𝑦𝑖
𝑚𝑢 − 𝑦𝑖
𝑚𝑣)2
𝑘
𝑖=1
 
where (𝑥𝑖
𝑚𝑢 , 𝑦𝑖
𝑚𝑢) and (𝑥𝑖
𝑚𝑣 , 𝑦𝑖
𝑚𝑣) is the 𝑖𝑡ℎ location 
states of trajectory 𝑚𝑢 and 𝑚𝑣 respectively.   
B. Feature Selection  
We design the three following features to detect and 
classify the misbehaviour attacks: Movement Plausibility 
Check (𝑀𝑃𝐶), Minimum Distance to Trajectories (𝑀𝐷𝑇) 
and Minimum Translation Distance to Trajectories (𝑀𝑇𝐷𝑇). 
The 𝑀𝑃𝐶 aims to record misbehaviours when the vehicle 
attackers are moving (𝑣𝑥 ≠ 0 or 𝑣𝑦 ≠ 0), but reported 
locations are unchanged. The 𝑀𝐷𝑇 is used to investigate 
whether the movement pattern of the suspected vehicles is 
similar to any of the logged trajectory patterns. Finally, the 
𝑀𝑇𝐷𝑇 will check whether the movement pattern of the 
suspected vehicles is similar to any of the logged trajectory 
translation.  
Feature 1: MPC. Given an observed trajectory 𝑚 =
{𝑠1, 𝑠2, … , 𝑠𝑛} and a pre-selected constant K, for every two 
consecutive observation {𝑠𝑖−1, 𝑠𝑖} (𝑖 = 2, 𝑛̅̅ ̅̅̅),  we verify the 
movement attack via 𝑘𝑖  as:  
After calculating all 𝑘, the 𝑀𝑃𝐶 of 𝑚 will be calculated 
as:  
𝑀𝑃𝐶(𝑚) = ∑
𝑘𝑖
𝑛 − 1
𝑛
𝑖=2
 
𝑘𝑖 = {
𝐾 𝑖𝑓 𝑠𝑖−1(𝑣) ≠ 0 ⋀ 𝑠𝑖−1(𝑥) = 𝑠𝑖(𝑥) ⋀ 𝑠𝑖−1(𝑦) = 𝑠𝑖(𝑦)
0             𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
 
 
Feature 2: MDT. Given an 𝑛 − 𝑠𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 trajectory 𝑚 
and the set of legitimate trajectories 𝐿, 𝑀𝐷𝑇 of 𝑚 will be 
calculated as follows:  
𝑀𝐷𝑇(𝑚, 𝐿) = min{𝑑𝑚𝑖𝑛(𝑚, 𝐿𝑖) ∀𝐿𝑖 ∈ 𝐿}  
where 𝑑min(𝑚, 𝐿𝑖) = min{𝑑(𝑚, 𝐿𝑖
𝑛)} ∀𝐿𝑖
𝑛 as a subset of 
𝑛 consecutive sequences in 𝐿𝑖.  
Feature 3: MTDT. Given an observed trajectory 𝑚 with 
𝑛 sequences 𝑚 = {(𝑥1, 𝑦1), (𝑥2, 𝑦2) … , (𝑥𝑛 , 𝑦𝑛)}  and the set 
of legitimate trajectories 𝐿, the 𝑀𝑇𝐷𝑇 between 𝑚 and 𝐿𝑖 is 
calculated in three steps as follows:  
1) Calculate the centroid point of 𝑚: ?̅? = (𝑚𝑥̅̅ ̅̅ , 𝑚𝑦̅̅ ̅̅ ) as:  
𝑚𝑥̅̅ ̅̅ =  
1
𝑛
∑ 𝑥𝑘
𝑛
𝑘=1
 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑚𝑦̅̅ ̅̅ =
1
𝑛
∑ 𝑦𝑘
𝑛
𝑘=1
 
2) Let 𝐿𝑖 as one of the legitimate trajectories in L, assume 
that 𝐿𝑖 has 𝑞 consecutive location data sequences: 𝐿𝑖 =
{(𝑥1
𝐿𝑖 , 𝑦1
𝐿𝑖), (𝑥2
𝐿𝑖 , 𝑦2
𝐿𝑖), … , (𝑥𝑞
𝐿𝑖 , 𝑦𝑞
𝐿𝑖)}. We calculate the 
minimum translation distance between m and 𝐿𝑖 as follows. 
For every 𝐿𝑖
𝑗  as a subset of 𝐿𝑖 with 𝑛 consecutive 
observations 𝑗 = 1, 𝑞 − 𝑛 + 1̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ 𝐿𝑖
𝑗 =  {(𝑥𝑗
𝐿𝑖 , 𝑦𝑗
𝐿𝑖),
(𝑥𝑗+1
𝐿𝑖 , 𝑦𝑗+1
𝐿𝑖 ), … , (𝑥𝑗+𝑛−1
𝐿𝑖 , 𝑦𝑗+𝑛−1
𝐿𝑖 )}.   
2.1) Calculate the centroid point of 𝐿𝑖
𝑗: 𝐿𝑖
?̅? = (𝐿𝑖𝑥
𝑗̅̅ ̅̅ , 𝐿𝑖𝑦
𝑗̅̅ ̅̅ ) as:  
𝐿𝑖𝑥
𝑗̅̅ ̅̅ =
1
𝑛
∑ 𝑥𝑘
𝐿𝑗
𝑗+𝑛−1
𝑘=𝑗
 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐿𝑖𝑦
𝑗̅̅ ̅̅ =
1
𝑛
∑ 𝑦𝑘
𝐿𝑗
𝑗+𝑛−1
𝑘=𝑗
    
2.2) Calculate the translation vector as:  
𝑡̅ = (𝑡?̅?, 𝑡?̅?) =  (𝑚𝑥̅̅ ̅̅ −  𝐿𝑖𝑥
𝑗̅̅ ̅̅ , 𝑚𝑦̅̅ ̅̅ −  𝐿𝑖𝑦
𝑗̅̅ ̅̅ ) 
2.3) Calculate 𝑚𝑡  (𝑚 after translation by 𝑡̅) as:  
𝑚𝑡 = {(𝑥1 −  𝑡?̅?, 𝑦1 − 𝑡𝑦)̅̅ ̅̅ , (𝑥2 −  𝑡?̅?, 𝑦2 − 𝑡?̅?), … , (𝑥𝑛 −
 𝑡?̅?, 𝑦𝑛 − 𝑡?̅?)}  
2.4) The translation distance ?̅? between 𝑚 and 𝐿𝑖
𝑗
 will be 
the distance between 𝑚𝑡 and 𝐿𝑖
𝑗
: ?̅?(𝑚, 𝐿𝑖
𝑗) = 𝑑(𝑚𝑡 , 𝐿𝑖
𝑗).  
2.5) After calculating all ?̅?(𝑚, 𝐿𝑖
𝑗), the minimum 
translation distance between 𝑚 and 𝐿𝑖 will be: 
?̅?𝑚𝑖𝑛(𝑚, 𝐿𝑖) = min{?̅?(𝑚, 𝐿𝑖
𝑗)} ∀𝐿𝑖
𝑗 ∈ 𝐿𝑖  as a subset of 𝑛 
consecutive observations in 𝐿𝑖. 
3) The minimum distance between 𝑚 and 𝐿 will be 
calculated as:   
𝑀𝑇𝐷𝑇(𝑚, 𝐿) = min{?̅?𝑚𝑖𝑛(𝑚, 𝐿𝑖)} ∀𝐿𝑖 ∈ 𝐿. 
Fig. 1 illustrates the translation vector and the translation 
distance of two 5 − 𝑠𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 trajectories.   
IV. EXPERIMENTAL SETUP 
The VeReMi dataset has recently been published and is 
built specifically for testing location spoofing attacks in V2X 
scenarios [5]. The advantages of using the VeReMi dataset 
are (i) it presents different types of attackers; (ii) it simulates 
varied density conditions of vehicle network; (iii) it is 
consistent with its BSM’s broadcast rate; and (iv) the 
scenarios are conveniently labelled for using a machine 
learning approach. This section will describe VeReMi and 
present the applications of our three designed features in 
machine learning for detecting and classifying attacks in this 
dataset.   
A. Attacker Model 
Attackers in VeReMi are assumed to be local, insider and 
active, and able to operate in both uniform and non-uniform 
areas [1]. A local attacker can only broadcast falsified 
information within their defined communication range, 
hence the damage created should be equally local. Attackers 
are also assumed to be insiders so that they can communicate 
with other vehicles regardless of the cryptographic defence 
used in communication. Attackers can be active, which 
means they can inject falsified information in the network the 
way they want. Finally, uniform areas (e.g. highway regions) 
refer to the areas where the travelling information of the 
attackers can be consistently transmitted to other vehicles, 
which is the opposite of non-uniform areas (e.g. rural areas). 
B. Scenario and Attack Types 
The VeReMi dataset comprises of 5 position forging 
attacks, 3 vehicle densities (low, medium and high), 3 
attacker densities (10, 20 and 30 per cent) and each 
parameter set was repeated 5 times for randomization. The 
dataset contains the message logs of the attacking and benign 
vehicles including reception time stamp, claimed 
transmission time, claimed sender, unique message ID, GPS 
position (x, y, z), RSSI value, position noise and speed noise 
vector, for each receiving vehicle in every scenario. The 
messages are broadcasted every second, so we chose 𝜀𝑡 = 1 
for trajectory extraction (see Definition 2). Along with that, a 
Fig. 1. Illustration of calculating MTDT 
 TABLE I. VEREMI ATTACK TYPES DESCRIPTION [1] 
Type Details Parameters 
T1 
Constant Attacker transmits a fixed 
location 
x = 5560 
y = 5820 
T2 
Constant 
Offset 
Attacker transmits a fixed, 
offset added to the real 
position 
∆x = 250 
∆y = -150 
T4 
Random Attacker sends a random 
position inside the 
simulation area 
Uniformly random in 
playground 
T8 
Random 
Offset 
Attacker sends a random 
position in a rectangle 
around the vehicle  
∆x, ∆y are uniformly 
random in [-300, 
300] 
T16 
Eventual 
Stop 
Attacker behaves normally 
for some time and then 
attacks by transmitting the 
same position repeatedly 
Stop probability 
increase by 0.025 
each position update  
 
ground truth ﬁle is also maintained which records the true 
values of the BSM attributes of both attacker and benign 
vehicles. The attacker type attribute in the Ground Truth ﬁle 
keeps the label of the attack ID as described in Tab. I.  
C. Machine Learning Designs 
Given an 𝑛 − 𝑠𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 trajectory for inspection, it can 
be legitimate (referred as 𝑇0) or one of five types of attacks 
(referred as 𝑇1, 𝑇2, 𝑇4, 𝑇8, 𝑇16). The purposes of our 
designed features in detecting and classifying the attacks are 
as follows. 
𝑀𝑃𝐶 aims at classifying 𝑇1 and 𝑇16 from other attacks. 
We have 𝑀𝑃𝐶(𝑇0, 𝑇2, 𝑇4, 𝑇8) = 0 because 𝑘𝑖 = 0 ∀𝑖. On 
the other hand, 𝑇1 report constant location all the time, 
therefore 𝑘𝑖 = 𝐾 ∀𝑖, so 𝑀𝑃𝐶(𝑇1) = 𝐾. Meanwhile, for 
𝑇16, there should be at least one 𝑖 so that 𝑘𝑖 = 0 to indicate 
the time when attackers transform from normal state to attack 
state; while there should be at least one 𝑗 that 𝑘𝑗 = 𝐾 to 
reflect the attack. Therefore, we have 
𝐾
𝑛−1
≤ 𝑀𝑃𝐶(𝑇16) ≤
𝐾(𝑛−2)
𝑛−1
 (1). Our experiments show that choosing a small K 
may lower the performance of KNN and SVM as the 
classification distances will become too small. In this work, 
we select 𝐾 = 1000.  
When 𝑇1 and 𝑇16 are detected, 𝑀𝐷𝑇 will help to 
differentiate 𝑇0 from the remaining types 𝑇2, 𝑇4, 𝑇8 because 
𝑀𝑇𝐷(𝑇0) values should be close to 0 as normal trajectories 
should find similar moving patterns in the legitimate set. On 
the other hand, 𝑀𝐷𝑇(𝑇2, 𝑇4, 𝑇8) values should be large due 
to the small chance of having similar movement patterns. 
Moreover, 𝑀𝐷𝑇 can help to classify 𝑇4 from others because 
the 𝑀𝐷𝑇(𝑇4) values are much larger compared with 𝑀𝐷𝑇 
of other types. 
Our experiments show that 𝑀𝑇𝐷(𝑇2) and 𝑀𝑇𝐷(𝑇8) 
values are close, therefore 𝑀𝑇𝐷 alone cannot help to 
differentiate between 𝑇2 and 𝑇8. Therefore, we design 
𝑀𝑇𝐷𝑇 for further classifying these two types. As 𝑇2 is 
translated from a legitimate trajectory, 𝑀𝑇𝐷𝑇(𝑇2) values 
should be close to 0. Meanwhile, 𝑀𝑇𝐷𝑇(𝑇8) values will 
remain large due to the small chance of having movement 
pattern which is similar to a translated legitimate trajectory. 
With the three features, we implemented similar machine 
learning algorithms (i.e. 𝐾𝑁𝑁 and 𝑆𝑉𝑀) with [1] for 
comparison. In details, the 𝐾𝑁𝑁 was done using the 
MATLAB built-in function 𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑐𝑘𝑛𝑛 with Euclidean distance 
to compute the nearest neighbour. The number of nearest 
neighbours 𝐾 was tuned from 1-100, while 𝐾 with the 
highest correct-classification-rate (CCR) was chosen as the 
best 𝐾 for prediction model. For 𝑆𝑉𝑀, instead of using the 
binary classification 𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑐𝑠𝑣𝑚 function as presented in [1], 
we use the 𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑐𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑐 function which allow to classify for 
more than two types of attacks. We also use 𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑐𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑐 in 
binary classification as our experiments show that it always 
performs better than the 𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑐𝑠𝑣𝑚. 
D. Parsed Dataset and Feature Extractions 
The VeReMi dataset provides results of 225 simulations, 
45 for each type of attacks. We selected 80% of the data for 
training while the remaining 20% are used for testing. For 
each type of attack, 36 sets of simulation logged data were 
chosen randomly to include in the training data, while the 
remaining 9 logged results are included in the testing data. 
We extracted all the unique legitimate trajectories from the 
80% training dataset into a database. We assume that this 
database will be maintained by a central authority, where the 
vehicles can send their suspected observations to for 
querying and getting the judgement. We also extract the 
three features for every 𝑛 − 𝑠𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 trajectory in the 
training dataset to build the machine learning models. Notes 
that to calculate the 𝑀𝑇𝐷 and 𝑀𝑇𝐷𝑇 of a trajectory, this 
trajectory will be excluded from the legitimate database to 
avoid any duplication. Finally, for testing, for every 𝑛 −
𝑠𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 trajectory in the 20% testing dataset, we calculate 
its three features based on the extracted legitimate database 
to query with the detection and classification models. The 
behaviour labels of the trajectory will be used to verify the 
accuracy performance of the models.    
E. Inspection Length Consideration 
To apply our approach, we need all the three features to 
be valid for all inspected trajectories. It is obvious that 
𝑀𝑃𝐶(𝑇16) is invalid when 𝑛 = 1 or 𝑛 = 2 according to (1). 
Therefore, the minimum value of 𝑛 to be considered in this 
paper is 3. As 𝑛 will influence all the values of the three 
features significantly, we vary 𝑛 from 3 to 10 to study its 
impacts. Notes that when judging the behaviours of a 
suspected vehicle, if the central authority can gather 
observations from all other vehicles, 𝑛 can be very large as 
desired. However, if the observations come from a single 
source, 𝑛 is not likely to be too large as the suspected vehicle 
may move out from the communication coverage of the 
source, which break the continuity of the observations.  
F. Evaluation Metrics 
The detection performance of the approach can be 
evaluated through the precision and recall. Firstly, each 
prediction result will be counted in one of the four following 
categories: True Positive (TP): detect an attacker as an 
attacker; False Positive (FP): detect a legitimate observation 
as an attacker; False Negative (FN): detect an attacker as a 
legitimate vehicle; and True Negative (TN): detect a 
legitimate observation as legitimate. The precision is 
calculated as 
𝑇𝑃
𝑇𝑃+𝐹𝑃
, while the recall is calculated as 
𝑇𝑃
𝑇𝑃+𝐹𝑁
. 
We also formulate a confusion matrix to see the performance 
of the classification. 
V. RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS 
We evaluate our approach in a similar way to the 
evaluations in [1]. Firstly, we evaluate the detection for each 
type of attacks by combining only the corresponding attack 
data and the normal data to use in training and testing. For 
example, to evaluate the detection of 𝑇2, we keep only 𝑇2 
and normal data in the training and testing dataset while 
excluding all other attack types. Secondly, we evaluate the 
overall performance in differentiating between attacks and 
non-attacks by generalise the attack type, which means that 
all the attack label 1, 2, 4, 8, 16 will be relabelled as 1. 
Lastly, we evaluate the classification performance for the 
original labelled attack dataset in two cases: with and without 
the normal behaviours. Notes that authors in [1] avoided the 
evaluation of classifications when normal behaviours were 
included due to unbalance dataset which led to poor 
performance.   
A.  Detection per Attack Type 
Fig. 2 illustrates the detection capability of different types 
of attacks when applying 𝐾𝑁𝑁 and 𝑆𝑉𝑀, based on [1] and 
our approach. As can be seen in the figure, our approach 
achieved near 100% in precision and recall for 
𝑇1, 𝑇4, 𝑇8, 𝑇16 when applying either 𝐾𝑁𝑁 or 𝑆𝑉𝑀. The 
𝑀𝑃𝐶 feature will always be 1000 if a trajectory is 𝑇1, and 
always be 0 if it is normal. For 𝑇16, 𝑀𝑃𝐶 have a minimum 
value of 111 and maximum value of 888, both when 
inspecting with 10 sequences. Therefore, 𝑀𝑃𝐶 can be 
considered as a plausibility check for both 𝑇1 and 𝑇16 to 
achieve accurate detections. On the other hand, 𝑇4 and 
𝑇8 trajectories will have much larger 𝑀𝑇𝐷 and 𝑀𝑇𝐷𝑇 
values than the normal trajectories (most of 𝑀𝑇𝐷(𝑇4) and 
𝑀𝑇𝐷𝑇(T4) values are larger than 1000; most of 𝑀𝑇𝐷(𝑇8) 
and 𝑀𝑇𝐷𝑇(T8) values are larger than 100 and much smaller 
than 1000; while most of other 𝑀𝑇𝐷(𝑇0) and 𝑀𝑇𝐷𝑇(𝑇0) 
are smaller than 20), therefore it is not difficult to detect 
these attacks.   
For 𝑇2, we achieved much better precisions (the best rate 
is 98.5% for KNN with 3-sequence) and recalls (94% for 
KNN with 3-sequence) compared to [1]. [1] has low 
performance because it does not have any feature that can 
separate 𝑇2 from normal performance. Meanwhile, in our 
approach, the 𝑀𝑇𝐷 is specifically designed to separate 𝑇2 
from normal performance. Fig. 3a shows 𝑇2 detection 
capability with different 𝑛 sequence when applying KNN 
and SVM. It can be seen that in general when 𝑛 increase, the 
precision rates decrease significantly while the recall rates 
increase slightly. Notes that unlike other verification 
approaches, we do not try to predict the accurate locations of 
the trajectories. Instead of that, we try to find the minimum 
deviation of the reported trajectories compared with the 
normal patterns. A small 𝑛 is expected to create small 
accumulated deviations, hence lead to smaller 𝑀𝑇𝐷(𝑇0) 
margin (upper bound values are at about 50 when 𝑛 ≤ 5 and 
about more than 150 when 𝑛 > 5). On the other hand, 
statistics of 𝑀𝑇𝐷(𝑇2) are not affected much by 𝑛, because 
the deviations are always high. Therefore, when 𝑛 is small, 
the models may create better separations between normal and 
attack dataset, which lead to higher precision. However, the 
smaller margin will make the model more sensitive, so the 
𝑀𝑇𝐷(𝑇0) outliers will likely be detected as attacks, which 
leads to lower recall rates. When 𝑛 is large, deviations will 
be accumulated, 𝑀𝑇𝐷(𝑇0) will be increased so the models 
will have to increase the margin, which makes more 𝑇2 to be 
detected as normal and decrease the precisions. Nevertheless, 
the 𝑀𝑇𝐷(𝑇0) outliers will less likely be detected as attacks, 
which make the recall rates increase slightly.  
B. Overall Detection Performance  
For evaluations in detecting attacks in general (all attacks 
are re-labelled as 1), Fig. 2 shows the comparisons between 
our approach and [1], while Fig. 3b presents the comparisons 
between using KNN and SVM with different length of 
inspected trajectories in our approach. As can be seen from 
the figures, our approach shows significant better 
performances than [1], while there are always trade-offs 
between the precision and recall rates when choosing 
different inspection length. With KNN, our approach got a 
precision rate of 99.7% (𝑛 = 3), which decreases gradually 
to 96.84 (𝑛 = 10), whilst the recall rates are around 99%. 
When using SVM fitcecoc, the precision rates are always 
larger than 99.7%, however, the recall rates are ranging from 
93.2% (𝑛 = 4) to 95.2% (𝑛 = 10). On the other hand, when 
using the SVM fitcsvm, the precision rate is highest at 98.7% 
(𝑛 = 3), which decrease gradually to 88.77% (𝑛 = 10), 
while the recall rates are around 99%. As the model show 
very good performance when detecting 𝑇1, 4, 8, 16, the main 
misdetections should come from 𝑇2, so the explanations will 
be similar to these of Section V.B.  
C. Classification Performance  
Tab. II shows the confusion matrix of best CCR 
performance in classification over all the implementations, 
which is 𝐾𝑁𝑁 with 𝑛 = 6, 𝑘 = 97. As can be seen, 𝑇2 is the 
most difficult attack to classify, which was detected as 
normal in 6.39% of the cases. For all the experiments, the 
overall misclassification rates are always lower than 4.7%.  
When 𝑇0 are removed from the dataset, our models 
classify correctly 𝑇1, 𝑇4, and 𝑇16 in most of the cases. The 
main confusions are those between 𝑇2 and 𝑇8. Tab. III 
shows the confusion matrix between 𝑇8 and 𝑇2 when using 
the SVM fitcecoc. Our approach achieved small 
misclassified rates at less than 0.6%, which is a significant 
improvement from [1] where about 20% of 𝑇2 are 
misclassified as 𝑇4 or 𝑇8. The confusion rates also decrease 
when 𝑛 increase. 𝑀𝑇𝐷𝑇 is the main reason for this 
improvement. As 𝑇2 is a translated form of a legitimate 
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TABLE II. CONFUSION MATRIX OF BEST CCR KNN (N=6, K=97) (%) 
 
 
Ground Truth 
T0 T1 T2 T4 T8 T16 
P
re
d
ic
te
d
 
T0 98.25 0 6.39 0 0 0 
T1 0 100 0 0 0 0 
T2 1.75 0 93.61 0 0.04 0 
T4 0 0 0 100 0 0 
T8 0 0 0 0 99.96 0 
T16 0 0 0 0 0 100 
TABLE III. COMPARISONS OF CONFUSION RATES (%) BETWEEN T2 AND T8 
(SVM - FITCECOC) 
 n = 3 n = 4 n = 5 n ≥ 6 
T2 T8 T2 T8 T2 T8 T2 T8 
T2 99.83 0.36 99.9 0.3 99.94 0.01 1 0 
T8 0.17 99.64 0.1 99.97 0.06 99.99 0 1 
 
trajectory, 𝑀𝑇𝐷𝑇(𝑇2) value should be small. Meanwhile, 
𝑀𝑇𝐷𝑇(𝑇8) values should be much larger than 𝑀𝑇𝐷𝑇(𝑇2) 
because 𝑇8 will have high deviations from any translated 
trajectories. These deviations will also be accumulated to be 
higher when 𝑛 increases, which helps to classify between 𝑇2 
and 𝑇8 better. 
D. Inspection Length Considerations 
As can be seen from previous discussions, a small 𝑛 can 
give high precision rates in most of the cases, however, the 
prediction models will be more sensitive, which leads to 
lower recall rates. Moreover, too small 𝑛 can also lead to 
misclassification between 𝑇2 and 𝑇8. On the other hand, a 
large 𝑛 provides high recall rates and help to classify the 
attacks correctly. However, it will also decrease the precision 
rates significantly, not mention that in reality, long 
observations of the suspected vehicles are more difficult to 
achieve. Therefore, for a balance between the detection and 
classification capability and the potential to apply in real life 
scenarios, the recommended value of n to choose is 5. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we introduced three novel features 
extracted from an 𝑛 − 𝑠𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 trajectory for use in 
machine learning models to detect and classify misbehaviour 
attacks. We implemented these features in KNN and SVM 
and compared them to a previous approach that used 
different features. We evaluated the detection performance of 
our models using the VeReMi dataset and achieved overall 
precision of up to 99.7% while maintaining a recall in excess 
of 99%. The classification accuracy also outperforms the 
previous best obtained results with less than a 4.7% 
misclassification rate. Moreover, by studying the impacts of 
observation length on our models’ performance, we showed 
that our approach can provide reliable judgements even after 
as few as 3 observations (i.e. 3 seconds), which suggests that 
they can be useful for near real-time detection and 
classification. In the future, we aim to extend the attack 
models (e.g. adding more sophisticated types of 
misbehaviours) and improving the attack detection 
techniques to be able to detect and classify more types such 
as Sybil, replay, or stealthy attacks. 
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